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SUMMAR Y 
The research project 
This book is based on a research study carried out by the author in 1964 
and 1965. This study covered the budget systems in six manufacturing 
plants in the Netherlands, belonging to five different industrial companies 
in different industries : printing, metal products, textiles, electronics :md 
food. The study used both an analysis of company records and extensive 
interviewing. Altogether about 90 flrSt-, second- :md third-line manu­
facturing managers and about 50 controllers, budget accountants and 
work study engineers were interviewed: over 400 hours were spent in 
these interviews, which followed a structured pattern with both open 
and closed (pre-coded answer) questions. The research method was 
tried out in the first two plants and thereafter standardized for the re­
lmining four plants. The data coHected in the interviews are partly 
qll3litative and partly quantitative. The qualitative data consist of the 
interviewees' comll1ents, written down as literall y as possible. The 
quantitative data consist of the coding of the interviewees' answers 
where coding was possible and of data collected from company records. 
A selected part of the quantitative data was subjected to a statistical 
analysis (correlation :md factor :malysis) with the help of a large-scale 
denronic computer. The results of this statistical analysis were mcd 
, 
to test some hypotheses set before or in the beginning of the project. 
They were also used to explore tht' data as fully as possible in search for 
relationships which had not been predicted but which looked meaningful 
for understanding the functioning of the budget systems in the six plants. 
Most of the conclusions in this book are based upon this exploration; 
they are therefore tentative and do not have the value of scientific 
proof, but they can serve as hypotheses for further studies. 
The qual.itative data and the statistically treated quantitative data were 
related to all relevan t theoretical concepts available to the author, from 
the fields of accounting theory, the psychological theory dealing 'with 
motivation, and organization theory. The total investigation was guided 
by a systems conception: the budget system was seen as a part of the 
larger organizational system and having its own inputs and outputs. The 
purpose of the study can be interpreted as d iscovering the relationships 
bet\veen the inputs and the outputs of a budget system and explaining 
them in terms of different disciplines, mainly accounting, psychology 
and organization theory. The book is divided for this purpose into 
four parts: 
part I investigates the existing relevant theory; 

part H descri bes the research method; 

part III applies the theory and th.e data collected in the research to drav" 

the picture of the input-output relationships of the budget 
system and to arrive at conclusions ; 
part IV 	 translates these conclusions rather freel y into practical recoll1­
mendations for those actually involved in the process of budget 
controL 
The budget system and its outputs 
Not everything covered by the term 'budget' is included in the subject 
of this book. The interest of the project was in bndgets as fmallcial plans 
and in aU fm:mcial standards and objectives for current operations. It 
also included tech.nical, non-fmancial efficiency standards, at least to the 
extent that these were not primarily set for determining workers' 
wages but for detenn ining managerial efficiency. The non-financial 
eiticiency standards are the bricks the budget structure is built from. The 
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study did not include investment or capital bl\dgetin~ 
to budgeting for current operations. 
The outputs of the budget system which arc cons ide 
(sec Chapters I and 7) are not the outputs in terms of 
profit forecasts or budget variance reports. What 
output here is a contribution to the fin al goals of the 0 
flllal goals involved arc assumed to be profitability in I 
stockholders and also the well-being of employees 0 
contributions of budget systems to these gO:l ls which, 
this study are the Illotiliarioll of IlIlll10gers to bctrer pcrj;'r/i 
bution to profitability) and their joh .<ati.1acrioll (as l 
their well-beUlgI, An implicit issue in the total anal1 
between organ.iz~ control an indi v\clllar aut 
present in any managemen t control system and whit 
separated from the democratic ideals of large pan 
society. It has its implications for both the 1110tiva 
satisfaction of the people who were interviewed, but al 
attitude tow:lrds the total study. 
The budget system' s contribution to motivation is st 
blCkground of the psychological theory of job 1110tiv 
vation of a budgetee (a l11<1mger working in a budg 
into twO components: the reiell arlce of budget standard~ 
tasks, and the attitl/de of the budgetee towards th( 
1110tivation to fulfill budgetary standards depends f 
relevance component; the attitude componcnt can c 
counteract the relevance component, but it cannot I 
In the context of job sa tisfaction of budgetees as an 0 
system not only their satisfaction with their .iobs in a r 
also their feelings of pressure Jncl :lll xiety in their jo 
Inputs of a budget system 
A number of inputs into a budget system arc rdated 
relevance, attitude and job satisfaction. Some of these 
the basis of common sense or of rl'seareh work b~ 
found accordingly; o ther inputs were identifi ed in the 
data in this study. The inputs are cb ssifIed and the 
study did not include investment or capital budgeting: it was limited 
to budgeting for current operations. 
The outputs of the budget system wh.ich arc considered in this book 
(sec Chapters I and 7) are not the Olltputs in terms of accounting, likc 
profit forecasts or budget Y:lriance reports. What is considered an 
output herc is a contribution to the f1l1al goals of thc organization. Thc 
filial goals involved arc assumed to be profitability ill the interest of the 
stockholders and also the well-being of employees of all ranks. The 
contributions of budget systems to these goals which were measured in 
this study are the Ilfotillation of 1lfl11WgcrS to /)clfer pcrj;lY/1/i1I/CC (as a contri­
bution to profitability) and their j(,l; 5l1t/4actioll (as a contriburion to / 
their well-being . An implicit isslIe in the total analysis is the conflict 
bcmeell organizatiol1al control an inCliviClli;ila-utoiloIl1Y w hich is ") 
presenr in any managemcnt control system and 'which calmot bc seen 
separated from the democratic ideals of large parts of present-day 
society. It has its implications for both the motivation and the job 
satisLction of the people who were intervinved, but also for the author's 
attitude towards the total study. 
The budget system's contribution to ll1otivation is studied against the 
background of the psychological theory of job motivation. The moti­
varion of a budgetee (a manager working iII a budget system) is split 
into two components: the ,dClll1/lce of budget standards to thc budgetee's 
tasks, and the atfitl/de of the budgetee to·wards the system. Actual 
llIotivation to fulfill budgetary standards depc.nds Jim of all 011 the 
relevance component; the attitude component can either reinforct· or 
counteract the relevance component, but it cannot motivate by itself. 
In the conrext of job satisfaction of budgetees as an output of a budget 
system not only their satis[,ction with their jobs in a llarrO\vcr sense but 
also their feelings of pressure ;md anxiety in their jobs arc considered. 
Inputs of a budget system 
A number of inputs into a budget system arc related to the outputs of 
rckvllnce, attitude and job s:Jtisfacrion. SOllIe of these were predicted Oll 
the basis of common sense or of research work by others Jnd were 
fOllnd accordingly; other inputs were identified ill the exploration of the 
data in this srudy. The inputs are classified and the various classes of 
: 
l 
inputs are described in the chapters 8 through I4 of Part III of the book. 
The fmt class of inputs deals with the policy of setting budgetary stan­
dards tightly or loosely. The fact that standards are set call have a very 
real meaning for a budgetee's achievement motivation. Need for achieve­
ment is a powerful motivator. In order for a standard to functioll as a 
standard for achievement it should be tight, so tight that there is a real 
risk of its 1/01 being attained. This means that there should be a differCllce 
between sllch standards and the performance actually expected which is 
used in coordinating budgets in the accounting systelll. On the other 
hand it appears tl1at standards which arc so tight that they arc seen as 
impossible destroy motivation. An important role is reserved for the 
budgetee's superior to judge "vhat level of standards an illdividu'll 
budgetec can tolerate. Illteresting results have been obtained by COIll­
paring budgetees' evaluations of their departlllents' perfornunce to the 
official performance data in the budget variance H"pons. In SOllle plants 
the standards appear to be well 'internalized' and to agree .vith people's 
personal evaluation standards; in others they are not internalized at all. 
Besides the level of the standards other factors playa role here as well. 
T hese are illustrated in case studies. 
Another class of inputs into budget systems deals with the process of 
partici pation in the setting of stancbrds by the budgetee. There appears 
to be :t difference in budgetees' re:tctions to particip:ttioll in fl11:tncial 
and in non-financial standard setting. Budgetees who have no experil'llce 
in participHion in t1nancial startdard setting (most of these were ftrst-line 
managers) generally do not desire it. If they do parti ipate, however, 
they appear to be llluch lII ore motivated to fulfill the fmaneial standards 
that arc se t. Participation in the se tting of non-f1l1ancial (technical) 
standards or objectives is considered a prerogative of any manager: they 
feel dis,atisfied if they arc not enough involved. The reaction of a bnd­
getee to participation can be shown to be influenced by his persollality 
or culture: authoritarians are less motivated by participation in budget 
setting than non-a uthoritarians. 
The inputs imo a budget system by the controller's departlllent and work 
study sta ff consist of a technical contribution and a personal contribution. 
Both appear to have 1I10re negative than posi ti ve potential : the staff 
departments em easily have a negative illlpact upon the functioning 
of a budget systelll, but their possibilities for positively influencing 
4 
motivation arc limited: this depends Illlllh more on the 
budgetees in mannfactttring malugelllent. In the techn 
staff's task the most important condition is that acco 
sponsibilities. Althotlgh this is self-evident and denied t 
not always done. Assigning responsibilities in aCCOtlll 
even be rather difiicult and increasingly so with the ( 
organizations towards greater interdependence between ~ 
effect of the periodic management informa tion, Stich as 
reports, which staff' departments produce, appears to c 
on its being accompanied by personal two-way COlll tllllll 
staff and line lllarlagell1enr and even more between the l 
boss. For the staff's contribution to good persOld staff 
cation it appears to be most important that the staff lllaL 
specialist and that he tries to behave tactfull y. 
There arc some interesting differences in attitude betw 
.1Ild line managers in general which undoubtedly pta)' 
Illutual COllllllunication. Staff people tend to aSSll llle m 
role, identifying less with \vhat goes on on the shop 
have different satisfactions and frnstratiolls in their jobs th 
have. From a point of view of personnel management 
in this study appear to be somewhat less well managed til 
fact that the stafr has 1110re scope in spoil ing dUll in 
functioning of:t budget system may be rather frllstrat}ll€ 
the way to overcome rlus frustration is for the st~ft tc 
role as one of education. 
Of all inputs into a budget system the beh~vior of the 
bears the lllost crucial relationships to its outputs. The 
depends on hi s superior, so this type of influence oftell .'v 
however modifIed by the managerial skills of IIIdlVld 
managers. Superior-subordinate CO Il.llllunicatio.ll can 
influcnce budget motivation through frequent person-t 
about budget results and through the usc of budget r 
lIlance appraisal. In these cases the increase in II10tiv 
be accompanied by an increase in pressure feelings iil 
will be Illo tivated mainly by outside pressure. This pres 
teamwork between budgetees and lead to undesirable ( 
goating alld fIghting the system. Su perior-subordinate 
motivation are limited: this depen.ds much 11lo re on the superiors of the 
blldgetees in manufacturing management. tn the technical part of the 
st.lff's task the most important condition is that accounts follow re­
sponsibilities. Although this is self-evident and denied by nobody, it is 
not always done. Assigning responsibilities in accounting terms can 
even be wther difficult and increasingly so with the development of 
organizations towards greater interdependence between their parts. The 
effect of the periodic management inform.ation, such as budget variance 
reports, which staff departments produce, appears to depend strongly 
on its being accoll1p:mied by personal two-way cOllll1lunication between 
staff and line management :ll1d even marc betweclI thc budgetee and his 
boss. For the staff's contribution to good personal staff-line communi­
cation it appears to be most il1lportant that the staff man is a competent 
specialist and that he tries to behave t'lctfully. 
There arc some interesting differences in attitude between staff people 
and linc managers il1 general which undoubtedly playa role in their 
lIlutual communicatioll. Staff people tcnd to assume morc of a spectator 
role, identifying less with what goes on 011 the shop fl oor; they also 
have difterent satisfactions and frustrations in their jobs than line managers 
have. From a point of view of personlle! management the stafF people 
ill this study appear to be somewhat less well managed thall the line. The 
(ICt that tile staff has I110re scope in spoiling than ill improving the 
fUllctioning of a budget system may be rather frustrating to staff people; 
the way to overcome this frustration is fOf the staff to conceive of its 
rok as one of education. 
Of all inputs into a budget system the behavior of the budgctec's boss 
bears the most crucial rebtionships to its outputs. The boss in his turn 
depends on his slIpcrior, so this type of influellc ' often works pbnt-wide, 
however 1110difled by the managerial skills of individual middle-level 
managers. Superior-subordinate cOllllllunication can be shown to 
influence budget motivation through frequent person-to-pcrson contact 
about budget results and through the usc of budget results in perfor­
mance appraisal. In these cases the il1crease in motivation will easily 
be accompanied by an increase in preSSUfe fedings ill the budgetee: he 
wi ll be motivated mainly by outside pressure. This pressure Inay disrupt 
teamwork between budgetees and lead to undesir3blc effects like scape­
goating :llld fighting the system. Superior-subordinate communication 
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has positive effects on motivation without pressure symptOlIl5 when 
it uses group methods of leadership, like the usc of departlllent meetings 
and most important of all, the creation of a game spirit or an atmosphere 
of sportsmanship around attainment of budgetary goals. 'the game spirit 
represents Illotivation of the budge tee 'from within'. It depends strongly 
upon the leadership skills of the budgetee's superior, but also upon the 
way the system is organized: it presupposes a certain amount of free 
scope and the absence of rigidity, because a game requires a free area 
to play in. The motivation of adults through gallle~ is a neglected area 
in psychological theory; it could be called a blind spot of psychology, 
which is surprising because in daily life the motivating forces in g,ll1le 
situations can be observed widely. The signifIcance of game situations 
for our society as a whole has been shown most clearly by the Dutch 
social historian Huizinga, whose essay 'Homo Ludens' has inspired the 
conclusions in this study about the game aspect of budgeting. Techni­
cally the :Iecessary scope in budget control systems to permit the gamc 
spirit to operate can be created by the application of statistical techniques 
similar to those used in quality control, like the usc of control limits. The 
usc of statistical techniques in budgeting is still quite' rare. None of the 
fIve companies which were studied in this project used them, so that 
this book cannot ,eport on empirical evidence of their effect. Their 
use is more meaningful for the larger corporation than for the small one. 
All inputs into the budget system mCl1tioned so far were internal inputs: 
they could be influenced by management. As budget systems are open 
systems in interaction with the environment outside the organization, 
we must also take account of external inputs. One group of external' 
inputs consists of the type of people nVJilablc as budgctees. Their age 
and generation arc important: younger people appear to be more figure­
conscious and more independence-oriented. Their length of servicc 
in the job will also influence the degree to which they make usc of the 
flgures offered to them: budgetees subj,ected to a system ofjob-rotatiull, 
who are more recent in a job, will automatically have to rely more on 
the figures for lack of experience :IS an alternative way of controlling 
their departmcnts. Thc personali ty and the cultural background of the 
budgetees playa role, for example their 'job involvement': the inner 
urge to work hard and have tight goals for achievement. Another group 
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of external inputs is given through the technology of t 
srructure of its products and the managerial climate c 
management, who in their tum arc infhlenced by the 
operating in. The micro-analysis of management pro 
plants can be made more meaningful when supple 
interdisciplinary macro-analysis offorccs working on th, 
of external inputs is given through the tecMology of the plant, the cost 
structure of its products and the managerial climate created by its top 
management, who in their turn are influenced by the market they are 
opcrating in. The micro-analysis of management processes within the 
plants can be made more meaningful when supplemented with an 
ilUcrdisciplinary macro-analysis of forces working on the plant as a whole. 
